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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the twentieth century, a shift in tort law allowed 
consumers to hold manufacturers of goods, rather than just sellers, 
liable for injuries caused by said goods.1  However, a notable 
exception to this rule still exists for pharmaceuticals through the 
“learned intermediary” doctrine.  The learned intermediary doctrine 
provides that a drug manufacturer may evade liability for injuries 
caused to a patient when the manufacturer warns the prescribing 
physician of the dangers associated with the drug.2  For many years, 
drug manufacturers have relied on this doctrine as a shield from 
liability.  But should manufacturers continue to be allowed to do so? 
Since the 1990s, an epidemic has been brewing in the United 
States: the opioid crisis.  In 2017 alone, opioid overdoses — either 
caused by prescription opioids or illicit opioids such as heroin — 
caused 47,600 deaths in the United States,3 and the opioid crisis has 
cost the United States over $1 trillion from 2001 to 2017, according to 
 
 1. See generally MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 2. See Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 467–68 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 3. Drug Overdose Deaths, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 
19, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html 
[https://perma.cc/LJF2-RECF]. 
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estimates.4  In light of these alarming figures, President Trump 
declared the opioid crisis a “national emergency.”5 
As with any crisis, a question of liability arises and becomes 
especially relevant to any legal action taken by aggrieved parties.6  
Yet, when the spotlight has been pointed at pharmaceutical 
manufacturers — already under fire in a number of lawsuits7 — these 
companies have attempted to shield themselves from liability using 
the aforementioned learned intermediary doctrine.8  This Note argues 
that opioid drug manufacturers should not be able to hide behind the 
learned intermediary doctrine. 
This Note does not intend to place the burden of the opioid crisis 
solely on the shoulders of drug manufacturers.  “Pill mill” doctors and 
heroin dealers also contributed to the opioid crisis, and doctors, 
government regulators, law enforcement, and insurance companies, in 
addition to drug manufacturers, all have a role to play in curbing the 
epidemic.  Rather, this Note proposes that deterring drug 
manufacturers by removing a barrier to liability will create the ripple 
effects necessary to help alleviate the crisis. 
Part I of this Note chronicles the scale and tragedy of the opioid 
crisis in the United States, and how opioid manufacturers were a 
direct cause of the problem.  Part I then explains the learned 
intermediary doctrine, which drug manufacturers are currently able to 
rely on to avoid liability for harm caused by opioids.  Part II proposes 
 
 4. Economic Toll of Opioid Crisis Exceeded $1 Trillion Since 2001, ALTARUM 
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://altarum.org/about/news-and-events/economic-toll-of-opioid-
crisis-in-u-s-exceeded-1-trillion-since-2001 [https://perma.cc/7GXB-7WY4]. 
 5. Ali Vitali & Corky Siemaszko, Trump Declares Opioid Crisis National 
Emergency, NBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2017, 5:38 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/trump-declares-opioid-
crisis-national-emergency-n791576 [https://perma.cc/EM7R-ZSCT]. 
 6. Compare Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family that Built an Empire of Pain, 
NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-
family-that-built-an-empire-of-pain [https://perma.cc/6BC3-NQ7E] (blaming the 
marketing tactics created by Arthur Sackler), with Dan Merica, Trump Declares 
Opioid Epidemic a National Public Health Emergency, CNN (Oct. 26, 2017, 5:59 
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/26/politics/donald-trump-opioid-
epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/QHG3-K6JM] (reporting on a speech by 
President Trump in which Trump put at least part of the blame on Mexican heroin 
dealers). 
 7. Jerry Mitchell, Opioid Makers Face Hundreds of Lawsuits for Misleading 
Doctors About Drug’s Addictive Nature, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2018, 8:33 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/01/29/judge-stop-legal-fights-
and-curb-opioid-epidemic/1072798001/ [https://perma.cc/79W3-Y894]. 
 8. See, e.g., Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 708 (E.D. Ky. 
2003) (holding plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims against Purdue over OxyContin 
labeling were barred by the learned intermediary doctrine). 
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that an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine should be 
carved out for prescription opioids.  This exception is based on the 
collective practices of drug manufacturers in over-marketing opioids, 
which helped create the crisis.  The exception is also based on opioids 
not being “unavoidably unsafe,” as the learned intermediary doctrine 
relies upon, in their most common use.  Finally, Part III assesses the 
effects of creating this exception on the health care industry.  
Although exposing drug manufacturers to increased liability will carry 
some negative ramifications, this Note argues that the exception 
should still be instituted because those negative effects can be 
alleviated by realistic changes to the treatment of pain. 
I. THE OPIOID CRISIS AND THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY 
DOCTRINE 
In providing an overview of the opioid crisis and the learned 
intermediary doctrine, this Part discusses how the opioid crisis 
transpired, specifically examining the role of prescription opioids and 
drug manufacturers in causing the crisis.  Next, this Part discusses the 
application of the learned intermediary doctrine, the policy 
underlying the doctrine, and certain exceptions to the doctrine that 
have been carved out previously. 
A. The Opioid Crisis 
Opioids are a class of drugs derived from the opium poppy that are 
typically used to treat pain.9  These drugs also react strongly with 
pleasure receptors in humans and can be very addictive with 
debilitating withdrawal effects.10  Opioids come in a number of forms, 
with three in particular contributing to the opioid crisis.  The first and 
most recent contributor is fentanyl.  Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid 
most often used for treating severe pain (such as advanced cancer 
pain) that is fifty times more potent than morphine.11  In many cases, 
 
 9. Josh Katz, Short Answers to Hard Questions About the Opioid Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Aug. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/03/upshot/opioid-drug-overdose-
epidemic.html [https://perma.cc/K8PL-76DX]. 
 10. See SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND: THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA’S OPIATE 
EPIDEMIC 38–39 (2015) (“[N]o other molecule in nature provided such merciful pain 
relief, then hooked humans so completely, and punished them so mercilessly for 
wanting their freedom from it.”). 
 11. Fentanyl, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/fentanyl.html [https://perma.cc/2C8B-
AQPP]. 
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fentanyl is being laced into heroin and into counterfeit pills without 
the user’s knowledge, causing users to intake far stronger opioids than 
intended, leading to overdoses.12  The second contributor is heroin, a 
Schedule I drug.13  While heroin has been around for over a 
century,14 more potent forms sold more cheaply and conveniently by 
dealers from Xalisco, Mexico have led to an increase in usage.15 
The third contributor, and most relevant for this Note, is 
prescription opioids.  For much of the twentieth century, doctors were 
hesitant to prescribe opioids to patients because of the fear of 
addiction.16  This attitude gradually changed in the 1970s as doctors 
began prescribing opioids for cancer and terminally ill patients.17  By 
the 1980s, however, the floodgates began to open.  In 1980, The New 
England Journal of Medicine published a letter to the editor authored 
by Jane Porter and Dr. Hershel Jick.18  The letter claimed that of the 
nearly 12,000 patients treated with opioids at a hospital, only four had 
become addicted.19  The letter did not provide any data on which 
opioids were given or the dosages prescribed,20 and the fact that these 
patients were carefully overseen by their treating doctors was 
overlooked.21  The letter was not even a formal scientific study.22  
Nevertheless, the letter was cited in a number of influential scientific 
studies on pain treatment,23 which helped reinforce by the 1990s the 
 
 12. Katz, supra note 9. 
 13. Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://www.dea.gov/drug-
scheduling [https://perma.cc/888F-TSNZ].  “Schedule I” refers to drugs that have “no 
currently accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse.” Id. 
 14. Heroin Overview: Origin and History, UNIV. OF ARIZ.: METHOIDE, 
https://methoide.fcm.arizona.edu/infocenter/index.cfm?stid=174 
[https://perma.cc/M2G4-KP4Z] (noting that heroin was first synthesized in 1874 and 
produced commercially in 1898). 
 15. See QUINONES, supra note 10, at 19, 43–45 (describing the black tar heroin 
being sold as more potent than other forms of heroin, and a “fast food-like” delivery 
system that made heroin easy to acquire at a low cost). 
 16. Id. at 80. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Correspondence: Addiction Rare in Patients 
Treated with Narcotics, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. 123, 123 (1980). 
 19. Id. 
 20. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 16. 
 21. Id. at 107. 
 22. Id. at 108. 
 23. See, e.g., Russell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid 
Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain: Report of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171, 183 n.38 (1986) 
(citing Porter & Jick to support the claim that opioids could be prescribed with little 
risk of addiction); see also QUINONES, supra note 10, at 107 (“Everybody heard it 
everywhere.  It was Porter and Jick.  We [referring to the medical community] all 
used it.  We all thought it was gospel.”).  In 2001, Time magazine called Porter & Jick 
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claim that opioids were non-addictive.24  In fact, this “pain 
revolution” helped swing the pendulum far to the other side, 
suggesting to physicians the idea that not only might opioids be safe 
to treat chronic pain patients, but also that doctors had been 
previously “undertreating” pain patients.25  This shift in thinking led 
to the emergence of blockbuster painkillers like OxyContin, which 
was heavily promoted and prescribed26 chiefly because it was thought 
to not be addictive.27 
From these origins, the opioid crisis was born.  Backed by the 
aforementioned research, drug manufacturers such as Purdue Pharma 
(“Purdue”), Cephalon, Inc. (“Cephalon”), Janssen Pharmaceuticals 
(“Janssen”), Endo Health Solutions (“Endo”), and Insys 
Therapeutics (“Insys”) began heavily manufacturing opioids.28  To 
foster sales of these drugs, manufacturers contributed substantial 
funds to patient advocacy groups and professional societies including 
the Academy of Integrative Pain Management and the National Pain 
Foundation, groups which focused on chronic pain and opioid-related 
issues.29  For instance, from 2012 to 2017, Purdue, Janssen, Mylan 
N.V., Depomed, Inc., and Insys contributed $9 million in total to 
opioid-related advocacy groups.30  In turn, these advocacy 
organizations heavily promoted the use of prescription opioids.31  
Manufacturers also relied on large pharmaceutical distributors, 
including McKesson Corporation, Amerisource Bergen Corporation, 
and Cardinal Health, Inc. to distribute their drugs.32  As a result of 
these marketing and distribution efforts by manufacturers, by 2015, 
 
“a landmark study” that helped eliminate the “myth” of opioid addiction. See 
QUINONES, supra note 10, at 108. 
 24. Id. at 109. 
 25. Id. at 95. 
 26. Mark A. Ford, Another Use of OxyContin: The Case for Enhancing Liability 
for Off-Label Drug Marketing, 83 B.U. L. REV. 429, 430 (2003) (noting that Purdue 
spent over $200 million marketing OxyContin in 1998, and that the drug became the 
most prescribed painkiller in the nation soon after). 
 27. See QUINONES, supra note 10, at 132. 
 28. Complaint at 45–46, Rutherford County v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 18-cv-
00238 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2018) (showing table of opioid manufacturers and the 
opioid drug they manufactured). 
 29. U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS COMM., FUELING AN 
EPIDEMIC: EXPOSING THE FINANCIAL TIES BETWEEN OPIOID MANUFACTURERS AND 
THIRD PARTY ADVOCACY GROUPS 3–4 (2018). 
 30. Id. at 1. 
 31. Id. at 12. 
 32. U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS COMM., FUELING AN 
EPIDEMIC: A FLOOD OF 1.6 BILLION DOSES OF OPIOIDS INTO MISSOURI AND THE 
NEED FOR STRONGER DEA ENFORCEMENT 1 (2018). 
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the number of opioids prescribed was enough for every American to 
be medicated around the clock for three weeks.33 
Concurrently, because opioids were addictive despite “studies” to 
the contrary, this surge in use was coupled with an increase in misuse 
and tragedy.34  Of the 97.5 million people who used painkillers in 
2015, 12.5 million people misused them.35  Further, drug distributors 
often failed to meet their reporting obligations under the Controlled 
Substances Act to “monitor and report suspicious orders under the 
controlled substances act to the Drug Enforcement Agency.”36  This 
resulted in massive amounts of opioids being diverted — given from 
the person to whom it was prescribed or from the pharmacy it was 
sold to another person for illicit use — contributing to the crisis.37  
Other users simply switched from prescription opioids to heroin 
because heroin was cheaper.38  Regardless of the form, this misuse of 
opioids exacted both a human and financial toll.  Over 47,000 people 
died from an opioid overdose in 2017,39 and the opioid crisis could 
claim a projected one million lives by 2020.40  The crisis has cost the 
United States over $500 billion per year attributable to criminal 
justice measures, treating patients in intensive care wards in hospitals, 
and lost productivity in businesses.41 
 
 33. Opioid Prescribing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 6, 
2017), https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/opioids/infographic.html#infographic 
[https://perma.cc/3VQC-V364].  Prescribing hit a peak in 2012, with 255 million 
prescriptions issued at a rate of 81.3 prescriptions per 100 people.  U.S. Prescribing 
Rate Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html [https://perma.cc/8NNW-
VLGJ]. 
 34. Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial 
Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 223 (2009). 
 35. Arthur Hughes et al., Prescription Drug Use and Misuse in the United States: 
Results from the 2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
& MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FFR2-2015/NSDUH-FFR2-
2015.htm [https://perma.cc/M9XA-VNWG]. 
 36. FUELING AN EPIDEMIC: A FLOOD OF 1.6 BILLION DOSES OF OPIOIDS INTO 
MISSOURI AND THE NEED FOR STRONGER DEA ENFORCEMENT, supra note 32, at 1. 
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 6. 
 39. Drug Overdose Deaths, supra note 3. 
 40. Jerry Mitchell, With 175 Americans Dying a Day, What Are the Solutions to 
the Opioid Epidemic?, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2018, 10:29 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/01/29/175-americans-dying-
day-what-solutions-opioid-epidemic/1074336001/ [https://perma.cc/NR5Z-2453]. 
 41. Maria LaMagna, More Evidence that the Opioid Epidemic Is Only Getting 
Worse, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 16, 2018, 10:34 AM), 
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Although the opioid crisis has hit rural communities the hardest, it 
has not left urban communities untouched.42  On the contrary, the 
opioid crisis has increasingly affected urban communities, with the 
highest rate of increases in opioid overdoses between July 2016 and 
September 2017 occurring in large metro areas (areas with a 
population of 1 million or more and covering a major city).43  In 
Philadelphia, for instance, opioids caused 1,217 overdose deaths in 
2017.44  Philadelphia Health Commissioner Thomas Farley described 
Philadelphia as “[a]n entire city floating on opioids.”45  The rise of the 
urban opioid crisis has been driven by heroin, and particularly heroin 
cut with fentanyl, as both are more prevalent in urban markets than 
prescription opioids.46 
The urban opioid crisis has especially taken a toll on black 
communities in urban environments, who are now dying at a faster 
rate than in suburban and rural areas.47  The CDC found that 
overdose deaths among black urbanites rose by 41% in 2016,48 while 
the Office of the Medical Examiner in Washington, D.C. found that 
opioid overdose deaths among black men between the ages of forty-
nine and sixty-nine increased by a whopping 245% between 2014 and 
2017.49  Whereas overdose deaths per 100,000 among blacks in rural 
areas was 6.7% in 2016, it was 22.7% among blacks in urban areas, 
which represented a drastic increase.50  This is as compared to whites, 
 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-much-the-opioid-epidemic-costs-the-us-
2017-10-27 [https://perma.cc/634M-7XBZ]. 
 42. Ahlishia Shipley, Opioid Crisis Affects All Americans, Rural and Urban, 
USDA: BLOG (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2018/01/11/opioid-
crisis-affects-all-americans-rural-and-urban [https://perma.cc/K2Z4-FR2N]. 
 43. Corky Siemaszko, Large U.S. Cities See Big Jump in Deadly Opioid 
Overdoses, CDC Data Shows, NBC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018, 2:12 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/americas-heroin-epidemic/large-u-s-cities-see-
big-jump-deadly-opioid-overdoses-n854041 [https://perma.cc/YL5D-YYWG]. 
 44. Larry Eichel & Meagan Pharis, ‘No Silver Bullet’ for Opioid Crisis in 
Philadelphia, Other Urban Areas, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/05/10/no-silver-
bullet-for-opioid-crisis-in-philadelphia-other-urban-areas [https://perma.cc/9Q4G-
3E6V]. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Siemaszko, supra note 43. 
 47. Marisa Peñaloza, The Opioid Crisis Is Surging in Black, Urban Communities, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/579193399/the-opioid-crisis-frightening-jump-to-
black-urban-areas [https://perma.cc/28UK-5BJJ]. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (citing charts). 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 691 
whose overdose deaths per 100,000 for urban and rural areas were 
much closer (25.6% for urban, 19.6% for rural).51 
While most opioid-related deaths are now caused by heroin and 
fentanyl, more than 40% of opioid overdose deaths in 2016 involved a 
prescription opioid,52 and experts agree that curbing the amount of 
prescription opioids available is necessary to stopping the crisis.53  
This Note proposes to do exactly that by removing the learned 
intermediary barrier to drug manufacturer liability, which will lead to 
fewer prescription opioids being manufactured and distributed. 
B. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
In tort law, manufacturers are typically held liable for any harms 
caused by their products.  However, the learned intermediary 
doctrine is a noteworthy exception to this general rule.54  Considered 
by some to have been first applied in 1948 in Marcus v. Specific 
Pharmaceuticals,55 the doctrine holds that a drug manufacturer may 
escape liability for injuries caused to a patient by the drug when the 
manufacturer warns the prescribing physician of the dangers 
associated with the drug.56  In other words, the duty of the 
manufacturer to warn in cases involving pharmaceuticals extends only 
to the prescribing physician, not the patient.57 
The doctrine is rooted in two fundamental principles.58  The first 
principle is that because drug warnings are often complex and the 
risks and benefits of a given medication are hard to gauge for each 
individual patient, physicians are best suited to evaluate whether to 
prescribe a given drug.59  The rationale is that a patient’s physician, 
 
 51. Id. (citing charts). 
 52. Prescription Opioid Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 
19, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/overdose.html 
[https://perma.cc/SS7P-RV7S]. 
 53. Katz, supra note 9. 
 54. Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Learned-Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th § 2[a] (1998). 
 55. Marcus v. Specific Pharms., Inc.,77 N.Y.S.2d 508, 508 (Sup. Ct. 1948); see also 
Mark P. Robinson, Jr. & Kevin F. Calcagnie, Vioxx and the “Learned Intermediary” 
Defense, 8 ANDREWS DRUG RECALL LITIG. REP. 7 1, Jan. 2005, at 2 (citing Marcus as 
the first application of the learned intermediary doctrine). 
 56. See Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 467–68 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 57. Kane, supra note 54, at Introduction. 
 58. Other principles have been put forth, such as a reluctance by the courts to 
intrude upon the doctor-patient relationship and an inability of drug manufacturers 
to adequately communicate with patients.  Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 
A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999). 
 59. Kane, supra note 54, § 2[a]. 
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unlike a drug manufacturer, is aware of a patient’s particular “needs 
and susceptibilities.”60  Thus, the physician is deemed to be the 
“learned intermediary” between a drug manufacturer and a patient,61 
and the physician is tasked with informing a patient of the various 
risks and benefits associated with the drug so that the patient can 
exercise informed consent.62 
The second principle is that prescription drugs are considered 
“unavoidably unsafe.”63  The premise here is that many drugs are 
incapable of being made completely safe given the current state of 
scientific knowledge.64  However, because the benefits of a drug are 
deemed to outweigh the risks associated with a drug, the drug is not 
considered defective or unreasonably dangerous when accompanied 
by proper warnings.65  An example of this would be the Pasteur 
treatment for rabies, which pairs the rather serious side effects of the 
remedy with the substantial risk of death from the disease itself.66  
Thus, the use and marketing of this treatment is justified, 
notwithstanding the concomitant side effects and risks. 
Although the learned intermediary doctrine is absolute in most 
states,67 some states have carved out limited exceptions.  One 
exception was created for direct-to-consumer advertising by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.68  In 
Perez, the court found that the principles underlying the learned 
intermediary doctrine were absent in direct-to-consumer 
advertising.69  Specifically, the court reasoned that (1) doctors had 
less time to see patients and thus could not provide a thorough risk-
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
 63. Kane, supra note 54, § 2[a]. 
 64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 65. Kane, supra note 54, § 2[a]. 
 66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 67. DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 9:25 (4th ed. 2014). 
 68. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1260 (N.J. 1999).  The Third 
Restatement of Torts has also suggested such an exception might apply.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1998) 
(“In certain limited therapeutic relationships the physician or other health-care 
provider has a much-diminished role as an evaluator or decisionmaker.  In these 
instances, it may be appropriate to impose on the manufacturer the duty to warn the 
patient directly.”). 
 69. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255. 
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benefit analysis for prescribing drugs,70 (2) the multi-billion dollar 
advertising budget of drug manufacturers undermined any claims that 
drug manufacturers could not effectively communicate with 
patients,71 (3) patients “now enter physicians’ offices with 
preconceived expectations about treatment because of information 
obtained from DTC [direct-to-consumer] advertisements,”72 and (4) a 
policy protecting “the patient’s interest in reliable information 
predominates over a policy that would insulate manufacturers.”73  For 
these reasons, the Perez court held that drug manufacturers had a 
duty to warn patients when they directly marketed their products to 
consumers.74 
Some courts have also recognized an exception when a drug 
manufacturer excessively promotes a product.  In these 
circumstances, the marketing for the drug is so extensive that the 
warnings given by the manufacturer to physicians are rendered 
meaningless, causing a physician to prescribe a drug when it would 
otherwise be unwarranted.75  For example, in Stevens v. Parke, Davis 
& Co.,76 Parke, Davis was required to warn physicians that an 
antibiotic carried a serious risk of causing bone marrow disease.77  
Despite this, Parke, Davis attempted to circumvent these warnings 
through marketing, such as by placing ads in physicians’ magazines, 
distributing calendars that mentioned the benefits of the drug without 
noting the serious side-effects, and having salespeople directly visit 
physicians to promote the drug.78  These marketing techniques caused 
physicians to prescribe the antibiotic when they otherwise may not 
have,79 leading to Parke, Davis being held liable to the patient 
because the warnings it had given physicians were nullified by its 
marketing tactics.80 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1255–56. 
 72. Id. at 1260. 
 73. Id. at 1262. 
 74. Id. at 1263. 
 75. See Caraker v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1030 (S.D. Ill. 
2001). 
 76. 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973). 
 77. Id. at 655. 
 78. Id. at 662. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 664. 
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II. FASHIONING AN OPIOID EXCEPTION TO THE LEARNED 
INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE 
Part II argues that an exception to the learned intermediary 
doctrine should be created for prescription opioids.  This would allow 
patients to hold drug manufacturers liable when a prescription opioid 
causes an injury to the patient unless the manufacturer directly warns 
the patient of the dangers of the drug.  The exception should be 
created because the opioid crisis has demonstrated the flaws inherent 
in the learned intermediary doctrine.  First, drug manufacturers did 
not adequately warn physicians about the dangers of opioids, and 
even if they had, concerted over-promotion of opioids diluted those 
warnings.  Second, prescription opioids are not “unavoidably unsafe” 
for treating chronic, non-cancer pain because their risks outweigh 
their benefits. 
A. Drug Manufacturers Engaged in an Industry-Wide Practice of 
Failing to Adequately Warn Physicians About Opioid Dangers, and 
Rendered Warnings Were Made Moot Through Over-Promotion of 
Opioids   
As noted above, one principle underlying the learned intermediary 
doctrine is that only physicians can adequately wade through the 
complex warnings accompanying a drug to decide whether to 
prescribe the drug to a patient.81  However, this principle assumes 
that the drug manufacturer gives physicians adequate warnings in the 
first place.82  In the case of opioids, drug manufacturers failed to 
properly apprise physicians of the dangers associated with opioids, 
and the manufacturers’ excessive marketing of these drugs rendered 
any warnings that were given meaningless.  Further, because these 
tactics constituted an industry-wide practice, a more expansive 
remedy in the form of an opioid exception to the learned 
intermediary doctrine is justified. 
1. Drug Manufacturers Failed to Warn Physicians about the Risks 
of Opioids 
While the learned intermediary doctrine protects drug 
manufacturers if they adequately warn a prescribing physician of the 
 
 81. Kane, supra note 54, § 2[a]. 
 82. See, e.g., Boehm v. Eli Lilly & Co., 747 F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he 
manufacturer of an ‘unavoidably unsafe’ but beneficial prescription must make ‘an 
adequate warning’ to prescribing physicians of the risks of adverse side effects.”). 
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risks associated with a drug,83 the marketing of OxyContin by Purdue 
Pharma illustrates how drug manufacturers failed to adequately warn 
physicians of the dangers of addiction linked to opioid painkillers.  
Underlying Purdue’s marketing strategy were claims that OxyContin 
was virtually non-addictive,84 despite these claims not being 
accurate.85 Part of the training for Purdue’s sales representatives 
consisted of teaching them that the risk of addiction was “less than 
one percent,” per the Porter and Jick86 study.87  Purdue also focused 
on marketing to primary care physicians with little pain-management 
training, who were functioning in the time-strapped world of 
managed care.88  Thus, not only did these practitioners have 
negligible experience to counteract the claims by Purdue, but pills 
were also a particularly appealing solution for doctors who could only 
devote only a few minutes to each patient.89 
2. Drug Manufacturers Over-Promoted Opioid Painkillers, 
Rendering any Warnings Meaningless 
Compounding this lack of warning, Purdue undermined any 
cautions given by over-promoting OxyContin.90  To prove over-
 
 83. See Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365–66 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 84. Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223. 
 85. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 127 (quoting a former Purdue sales manager, 
who said: “They told us to say things like it is ‘virtually’ non-addicting.  That’s what 
we were instructed to do.  It’s not right, but that’s what they told us to say . . . You’d 
tell the doctor there is a study, but you wouldn’t show it to him.”); First Amended 
Complaint at 14, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1884-
cv-01808 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5715954-Massachusetts-AGO-Amended-
Complaint-2019-01-31.html [https://perma.cc/5CUL-N7PT] (“Purdue always knew 
that its opioids carry grave risks of addiction and death.  Instead of being honest 
about these risks, Purdue obscured them, including by falsely stating and implying 
that ‘appropriate’ patients won’t get addicted.”). 
 86. Porter & Jick, supra note 18, at 123. 
 87. Id.; Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223. 
 88. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 97; Van Zee, supra note 34, at 222. 
 89. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 97–98 (noting doctors had increasingly less time 
with their patients, that doctors were “making their money by churning patients 
through their offices at a thirteen-minute clip,” and that “opioids helped a harried 
doctor with what was now the largest drain on his time: chronic-pain patients”). 
 90. Typically, independent knowledge by a physician of dangers associated with a 
drug can alleviate a manufacturer of liability as well.  Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. 
Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2007).  However, a drug manufacturer can still be held 
liable even if a physician knows of the dangers associated with a drug if the marketing 
of the drug could foreseeably induce a physician to prescribe the drug when it was 
otherwise not warranted.  Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 664 (Cal. 
1973).  As will be described more thoroughly in the main text, this is exactly what 
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promotion, a plaintiff must present “individualized proof that such 
over-promotion caused the physician to initiate or maintain the 
prescription at issue.”91  As noted earlier, over-promotion was found 
in Stevens, where the court determined that Parke, Davis used 
giveaways such as calendars, physicians’ reference articles, and 
personal visits by salesmen that ignored the side effects caused by the 
drug to undermine any warnings Parke, Davis was required to give.92 
Purdue engaged in similar and even more aggressive tactics.  First, 
Purdue provided giveaways, such as OxyContin-branded “fishing 
hats, stuffed toys, golf balls, pens with charts converting a patient’s 
dosage in other pills to OxyContin,” message paper pads, and even a 
swing jazz CD that “urged listeners to ‘Swing in the Right Direction 
with OxyContin.’”93  According to the DEA, no company had ever 
used branded merchandise as extensively to market a Schedule II94 
drug.95 
Second, Purdue hosted more than forty all-expenses paid national 
pain-management and speaker training conferences attended by some 
5000 physicians, pharmacists, and nurses recruited and trained to be 
speakers for Purdue and OxyContin.96  These types of conferences 
have been shown to influence the prescribing patterns of physicians.97  
Purdue also focused on Continuing Medical Education (CME) 
programs, funding more than 20,000 CME programs that promoted 
the benefits of OxyContin.98  CMEs essentially became marketing 
tools, with drug manufacturers wining and dining physicians, and 
featuring speakers picked by drug manufacturers to promote specific 
drugs.99  The influence of drug manufacturers on CMEs became so 
problematic that new rules were established to stymie this 
behavior.100 
 
occurred with the marketing of opioids. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 132 (“[Purdue 
gave] a very effective presentation . . . It really did make you doubt your feelings 
about what you’d been taught [about opioids] in medical school.”). 
 91. Patterson v. AstraZeneca, L.P., 876 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 92. Stevens, 507 P.2d at 662. 
 93. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 134. 
 94. Id. at 135 (“Schedule II is a federal designation for drugs with accepted 
medical uses, but a high potential for abuse resulting in dependency.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 135; Van Zee, supra note 34, at 221. 
 97. See Van Zee, supra note 34, at 221. 
 98. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 135–36. 
 99. Id. at 135. 
 100. Id. 
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Third, Purdue made extensive use of video marketing.  In 1998, 
Purdue sent out a non-FDA video to doctors, entitled: I Got My Life 
Back: Patients in Pain Tell Their Story, which not only showed 
patients claiming that OxyContin had greatly benefited them, but also 
reinforced the “less than one percent” claim about opioid 
addiction.101  The claims about quality of life improvement were 
completely unsubstantiated.102  In fact, three of the seven patients 
featured in I Got My Life Back became opioid addicts, two of whom 
died as active opioid abusers.103  The video did not portray these 
users as addicts, however.  On the contrary, I Got My Life Back made 
the bold claim that patients who appeared to be addicted were 
suffering from “pseudoaddiction.”104  “Pseudoaddiction is relief 
seeking behavior mistaken as drug addiction”105 and helped embed in 
physicians the idea that there was no limit to how many opioids they 
could prescribe because the patient could never really become 
addicted.106  These marketing strategies reinforced the idea that 
OxyContin should be “prescribed ‘for everything,’” rather than only 
for the specific uses on its FDA-approved label.107 
Purdue’s marketing did not stop with doctors.  Purdue also sent out 
a video, From One Pain Patient to Another: Advice from Patients 
Who Have Found Relief, which was intended for doctors’ waiting 
rooms.108  The video urged patients to discuss their pain with their 
doctors and aimed to assuage patient concerns about taking opioids, 
again citing the “less than one percent” addiction rate claim.109  These 
videos also came at a time when patients were becoming more 
 
 101. Id. at 136. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See John Fauber & Ellen Gabler, What Happened to the Poster Children of 
OxyContin?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 8, 2012, 
http://archive.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/what-happened-to-the-poster-
children-of-oxycontin-r65r0lo-169056206.html/ [https://perma.cc/5ASQ-V86H]. 
 104. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Opioids, YOUTUBE (HBO television 
broadcast Oct. 23, 2016), https://youtu.be/5pdPrQFjo2o?t=10m40s 
[https://perma.cc/EV4A-6KPQ] (showing footage from I Got My Life Back in which 
a doctor discusses the concept of “pseudoaddiction”). 
 105. Id. (quoting Dr. Alan Spanos from I Got My Life Back); see also QUINONES, 
supra note 10, at 109 (“Usually, a patient demanding ever-higher doses of a drug 
would be proof that the drug wasn’t working.  But in opiate pain treatment, it was 
taken as proof that the doctor hadn’t yet prescribed enough.”). 
 106. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 110. 
 107. Ford, supra note 26, at 444–45. 
 108. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 136–37. 
 109. Id. 
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comfortable demanding drugs for treatment.110  Purdue’s marketing 
program additionally included targeting doctors who prescribed 
opioids at the highest rate, paying large bonuses to sales 
representatives based on sales of OxyContin, and a coupon program 
that provided patients with a free seven to thirty-day supply of 
OxyContin.111 
In 2001 alone, Purdue spent $200 million on an extensive 
marketing campaign,112 which spurred OxyContin sales from $44 
million in 1996 to approximately $3 billion between 2001 and 2002.113  
This record of corporate behavior constitutes the “individualized 
proof” required to satisfy the over-promotion exception to the 
learned intermediary doctrine that would normally preclude liability 
for drug manufacturers when a doctor is prescribing the medication.  
Moreover, the video intended for physicians’ waiting rooms arguably 
fulfills the direct-to-consumer exception established by Perez.114  
Specifically, the videos demonstrated that drug manufacturers could 
directly reach consumers115 and that patients would enter their 
doctor’s office with preconceived notions of the treatment they 
should receive, thus undermining the doctor-patient relationship.116 
While Purdue’s OxyContin campaign is the most publicized 
example of opioid over-promotion, it is not the only example.  In 
2008, Cephalon agreed to a $425 million settlement to resolve claims 
of off-label marketing117 for its drug, Actiq, in violation of the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetics Act.118  Actiq is a “transmucosal immediate-
release fentanyl” (“TIRF”) opioid119 that had been approved for 
 
 110. Id. at 96. 
 111. Id. at 133–34 (noting that Purdue paid $40 million in bonuses related to 
OxyContin sales in 2001); Van Zee, supra note 34, at 222. 
 112. Van Zee, supra note 34, at 221. 
 113. Id. at 223. 
 114. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1263 (N.J. 1999). 
 115. Id. at 1255–56. 
 116. Id. at 1260. 
 117. Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label”, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/other/offlabel/default.htm [https://perma.cc/7RT5-
2WHG] (defining “off label use” as “using an FDA-approved drug for an 
unapproved use”). Hence, “off label marketing” would be marketing approved drugs 
for unapproved uses. 
 118. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Biopharmaceutical Company, Cephalon, to 
Pay $425 Million and Enter Plea to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Marketing 
(Sept. 29, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/September/08-civ-
860.html [https://perma.cc/4DAA-BU7R] [hereinafter DOJ Press Release]. 
 119. Thomas Sullivan, FDA: Transmucosal Immediate-Release Fentanyl (TIRF) 
REMS, POL’Y & MED. (May 6, 2018), http://www.policymed.com/2012/01/fda-
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treating pain in opioid-tolerant cancer patients.120  However, between 
2001 and 2006, Actiq was marketed for treating other ailments, such 
as migraines and generic injuries, even in those patients who were not 
opioid-tolerant.121  Cephalon did this by specifically targeting 
physicians other than oncologists (including general practitioners, 
much like Purdue)122 and training its sales force to stress that “pain is 
pain” in contravention of an FDA label restriction limiting usage to 
only treating cancer pain.123  Cephalon also utilized direct physician-
to-salesperson contact and funded CME programs.124 
Another more recent example is that of Insys and its drug, Subsys, 
which like Actiq is a TIRF opioid approved for treating breakthrough 
pain (severe pain that occurs in patients already medicated with 
painkillers) in cancer patients.125  The Subsys marketing plan had 
several features.  First, starting with the launch of Subsys in 2012, 
Insys spent $10 million funding speaker programs.126  Insys paid 
doctors hundreds of thousands of dollars to speak at these 
engagements on the condition that they would prescribe or continue 
prescribing Subsys, with the highest paid speakers each being paid 
more than $200,000.127  Insys even attracted one doctor to be a 
speaker by hiring an exotic dancer to woo him; this doctor ended up 
accounting for 58% of Subsys’s prescriptions in Illinois over a three-
year period.128  As a result of this arrangement, Subsys sales increased 
 
transmucosal-immediate-release-fentanyl-tirf-rems.html [https://perma.cc/P5VH-
SZSE].  These fentanyl-based opioids are different than OxyContin, which contains 
large doses of oxycodone, which is molecularly similar to heroin.  QUINONES, supra 
note 10, at 124.  This is further contrasted with other types of opioids such as Vicodin 
and Percocet, which combine small doses of oxycodone with acetaminophen (the 
pain-killing ingredient in Tylenol). Id. at 125. 
 120. DOJ Press Release, supra note 118. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See supra Section II.A.1 (“Purdue also focused on marketing to primary care 
physicians with little pain-management training . . . ”). 
 123. DOJ Press Release, supra note 118. 
 124. Id.; see also supra Section II.A.2 (“CMEs essentially became marketing tools, 
with drug manufacturers wining and dining physicians, and featuring speakers picked 
by drug manufacturers to promote specific drugs.”). 
 125. Evan Hughes, The Pain Hustlers, N.Y. TIMES: THE MONEY ISSUE (May 2, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/02/magazine/money-issue-insys-
opioids-kickbacks.html [https://perma.cc/D6PT-VGCD]. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.; see also Nate Raymond, North Carolina Accuses Drugmaker Insys of 
Scheme to Push Opioid, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2017, 11:40 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-opioids/north-carolina-accuses-drugmaker-
insys-of-scheme-to-push-opioid-idUSKBN1EF292 [https://perma.cc/GK7Z-KA8M]. 
 128. Hughes, supra note 125. 
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by more than 1,000% between 2012 and 2013.129  According to federal 
prosecutors, all of this amounted to a kickback scheme,130 a charge to 
which one former Subsys speaker from Rhode Island recently pled 
guilty.131 
Second, Insys specifically targeted doctors who wrote the most 
prescriptions.132  At the top of Insys’s list — the “highest decile” — 
were doctors that did not specialize in cancer pain.  This strategy 
resembles Purdue’s and Cephalon’s targeting of primary care 
physicians.  It was common knowledge in the industry that sales 
representatives should target pain doctors and other non-
oncologists,133 because doctors can write prescriptions for off-label 
usage at their own discretion,134 and doctors lacking much experience 
with these types of medications135 are presumably more easily 
influenced to do so.  As a result of these efforts, as of September 
2016, only 4% of Subsys prescriptions were written by oncologists, 
and only about 20% of patients receiving Subsys actually suffered 
from breakthrough cancer pain — the only pain Subsys was approved 
to treat.136 
Finally, Insys fraudulently obtained insurance reimbursement for 
Subsys.  Due to the risks associated with the drug, coverage 
reimbursement required prior authorization and insurers would only 
pay for Subsys when it was used to treat breakthrough cancer pain.137  
Using a team of “prior authorization specialists,” Insys 
representatives would call insurers, pretend to be from a doctor’s 
office (with blocked caller ID to disguise their true identities), and tell 
the insurer that the patient had breakthrough cancer pain when the 
patient in fact did not.138  These tactics caused the approval rate of 
 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Nate Raymond, Rhode Island Doctor Pleads Guilty to Opioid Kickback 
Scheme Related to Insys, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2017, 2:48 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-opioids/rhode-island-doctor-pleads-guilty-to-
opioid-kickback-scheme-related-to-insys-idUSKBN1CU2SA 
[https://perma.cc/HS4G-SQ78]. 
 132. Hughes, supra note 125. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 97. 
 136. Hughes, supra note 125. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.; see also U.S. SENATE HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS COMM., 
FUELING AN EPIDEMIC: INSYS THERAPEUTICS AND THE SYSTEMATIC MANIPULATION 
OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION 8–10 (2017) (analyzing the transcript of such a call from 
an Insys sales representative to an insurance company representative). 
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Subsys to surge to 87% by 2013.139  All of these tactics, taken 
together, constitute over-promotion by Insys.140 
3. Drug Manufacturers’ Engagement in Industry-Wide Marketing 
Practices Justifies the Creation of an Opioid Exception to the 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
 
Although the actions of Purdue, Cephalon, Insys, and other opioid 
manufacturers would be sufficient to prevent each individually from 
asserting the learned intermediary doctrine on failure to warn or 
over-promotion grounds, these sales tactics constituted an industry-
wide practice, which warrants the establishment of an opioid 
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine.  This position is 
supported by the reasoning behind the joint liability doctrine, which 
allows multiple tortfeasors to be held liable for the full amount of 
damages caused by their conduct.141 
In the seminal case of Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,142 
Judge Jack Weinstein discussed the concept of joint liability in finding 
that the manufacturers of blasting caps could be tried together on the 
issue of joint liability.143  First, Judge Weinstein outlined the elements 
of joint liability: “(1) causing harm (2) by cooperative or concerted 
activities (3) which violated a legal standard of care.”144  Next, the 
decision described three major policy reasons underlying joint 
liability: 
The first is the problem of joint or group control of risk: the need to 
deter hazardous behavior by groups or multiple defendants as well 
as by individuals. The second is the problem of enterprise liability: 
the policy of assigning the foreseeable costs of an activity to those in 
the most strategic position to reduce them. The third is the problem 
of fairness with respect to burden of proof: the desire to avoid 
denying recovery to an innocent injured plaintiff because proof of 
 
 139. Hughes, supra note 125. 
 140. Markland v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1322 (M.D. Fla. 
2017) (citing plaintiff’s argument that the learned intermediary doctrine should not 
“be applied in this case due to Insys’ aggressive over promotion of Subsys”).  The 
Court did not reach this issue because it found plaintiff’s claims to be preempted by 
federal law.  Id. at 1331 n.6. 
 141. See Tilcon Capaldi, Inc., v. Feldman, 249 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2001) (defining 
“joint liability”). 
 142. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 143. Id. at 381. 
 144. Id. at 371. 
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causation may be within defendants’ control or entirely 
unavailable.145 
Judge Weinstein also delved into what is considered “cooperative 
or concerted activities.”  The decision held that “cooperative or 
concerted” activity does not mean that an express business venture 
must exist; “all that is required is that there shall be a common design 
or understanding.”146  Indeed, “The variety of business and property 
relationships in which joint control of risk has been found 
demonstrates the flexibility of the doctrine. Liability is not limited to 
particular formal modes of cooperation, nor to illegal or grossly 
negligent activities.”147  To this end, plaintiffs can show that 
defendants jointly controlled a risk by “submit[ting] evidence that 
defendants, acting independently, adhered to an industry-wide 
standard or custom.”148  Finally, although Judge Weinstein also stated 
that “the existence of industry-wide standards or practices alone will 
not support, in all circumstances, the imposition of joint liability,”149 
he also articulated, “[T]he point [of joint liability] is not only that the 
damage is caused by multiple actors, but that the sole feasible way of 
anticipating costs or damages and devising practical remedies is to 
consider the activities of a group.”150 
These principles offer a theory of joint liability that may be applied 
to opioid drug manufacturers.  Per the foregoing analysis,151 the 
marketing practices of Purdue, Cephalon, and Insys considerably 
overlap.  First, all three companies targeted non-oncologist 
physicians, especially primary care and pain doctors and particularly 
those doctors known for heavy prescribing practices.152  Second, each 
of these companies marketed off-label uses for their drugs.153  Finally, 
each company made extensive use of educational seminar-type 
engagements, such as CMEs and speaker series.154  The confluence 
and intention of these three strategies indicate that these types of 
actions were “industry-wide standards and practices.” 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 374. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 378. 
 151. See supra Section II.A.1 and II.A.2. 
 152. See supra Section II.A.1 and II.A.2. 
 153. See supra Section II.A.1 and II.A.2. 
 154. See supra Section II.A.1 and II.A.2. 
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Further, a finding of joint liability based on the marketing practices 
of Purdue, Cephalon, and Insys (among others) fulfills the three 
policy goals of the joint liability doctrine.  As previously explained, 
joint control of risk is “the need to deter hazardous behavior by 
groups or multiple defendants as well as by individuals.”155  It is 
necessary to deter drug manufacturers from excessively marketing 
opioids, thereby reducing the number of opioids in circulation.  The 
second consideration is enterprise liability, which is “the policy of 
assigning the foreseeable costs of an activity to those in the most 
strategic position to reduce them.”156  Drug manufacturers are not 
only the entities most in control of producing and distributing opioids 
but are also the only entities in control of their marketing protocols.  
As drug companies have previously circumvented government limits 
on marketing,157 drug companies are thus in the most strategic 
position to reduce the foreseeable costs of their activities.  Finally, as 
to fairness with respect to the burden of proof, patients were never 
intended to see the majority of marketing materials distributed by 
drug companies.  The proof of causation, therefore, is largely within 
the control of drug manufacturers because patients must rely largely 
on materials within drug manufacturers’ possession to prove their 
cases. 
It may be true that data showing which types of patients were 
prescribed opioids may disclose which drug manufacturers are 
responsible for specific injuries.158  Thus, unlike the fact pattern in 
Hall, the drug manufacturers here are not unidentifiable parties.  
However, the purpose of joint liability is to reduce the possibility of 
risk and spread costs by considering the activities of individuals as a 
group.159  Going after only one drug manufacturer will not end the 
opioid crisis.  To illustrate, the conduct of Insys occurred five years 
after Purdue pled guilty in 2007 to criminal charges about 
 
 155. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 371. 
 156. Id. 
 157. DOJ Press Release, supra note 118 (describing how Cephalon circumvented 
FDA limits on off-label marketing); Hughes, supra note 125 (describing how Insys 
circumvented FDA limits on off-label prescribing). 
 158. What Information Does an Electronic Health Record (EHR) Contain?, 
HEALTHIT.GOV (Mar. 17, 2013), https://www.healthit.gov/faq/what-information-
does-electronic-health-record-ehr-contain [https://perma.cc/8AUN-QBJB]. 
 159. See Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378 (holding that joint liability “would represent 
rather the law’s traditional function of reviewing the risk and cost decisions inherent 
in industry-wide safety practices”). 
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misrepresenting the abusive potential of OxyContin.160  In other 
words, even if one drug manufacturer is held liable for opioid-related 
conduct, another may spring up, and the conduct of each company 
only worsens the opioid crisis.  Further, despite criminal penalties, 
Purdue has continued to peddle opioids.161  Since a 2007 
Massachusetts judgment against it, Purdue has sold “more than 
70,000,000 [70 million] doses of opioids in Massachusetts,” collecting 
“a revenue of $500,000,000 [$500 million].”162  Only by considering 
the actions of drug manufacturers as a group and imposing liability on 
industry-wide practices collectively can proper deterrence be 
achieved.163  Accordingly, the policy justifications for joint liability 
mandate the creation of an opioid exception to the learned 
intermediary doctrine. 
B.  Prescription Opioids Are Not “Unavoidably Unsafe” for Treating 
Chronic, Non-Cancer Pain 
The other major principle underlying the learned intermediary 
doctrine is that prescription drugs are “unavoidably unsafe” — that is, 
the drugs are not considered unreasonably dangerous when 
accompanied by proper warnings because the benefits associated with 
these drugs outweigh the costs.164  As far as prescription opioids are 
concerned, this premise may be true when the drugs are used to treat 
acute temporary pain or pain in cancer patients.165  The efficacy of 
treating chronic, non-cancer pain with opioids, however, is far less 
certain.166  Because non-cancer patients make up the overwhelming 
majority of opioid users, as discussed infra, the inquiry should be 
whether opioids are unavoidably unsafe when treating chronic, non-
cancer pain. 
 
 160. Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 10, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-
web.html [https://perma.cc/6ED9-PJ6L]. 
 161. First Amended Complaint at 12, Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 
1884-cv-01808 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2019) (alleging that since a 2007 judgment 
against it, Purdue visited Massachusetts prescribers and pharmacists “more than 
150,000 times”). 
 162. Id. at 8. 
 163. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 378 (holding that in certain circumstances, joint liability 
is “the only feasible method of ascertaining risks, imposing safeguards and spreading 
costs is through joint liability or other methods of joint risk control”). 
 164. Kane, supra note 54, § 2[a]. 
 165. Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223 (noting that the science supporting treating 
acute and cancer pain with opioids is “robust”). 
 166. Id. (noting “there is still much controversy in medicine about the use of 
opioids for chronic non–cancer-related pain”). 
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Some courts have held that comment k to section 402 of the Second 
Restatement of Torts167 – which gave birth to the concept of 
“unavoidably unsafe” — should always apply to prescription drugs so 
long as they are accompanied by proper warnings.168  Other courts 
have suggested a case-by-case inquiry as to whether a prescription 
drug is unavoidably unsafe.169  In Toner v. Lederle Laboratories,170 
for example, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that “[comment k] 
contemplates a weighing of the benefit of the product against the 
risk,” and that “this weighing process should consider the value of the 
benefit, the seriousness of the risk, and the likelihood of both.”171  
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court in Belle Bonfils Memorial 
Blood Bank v. Hansen172 held that for a drug to be classified as 
“unavoidably unsafe,” “the product’s utility must greatly outweigh 
the risk created by its use; the risk must be a known one; the 
product’s benefits must not be achievable in another manner; and the 
risk must be unavoidable under the present state of knowledge.”173  
The Hansen court also held that the “benefit should extend to the 
vast majority of the users of the product.”174 
Even the Third Restatement of Torts seems to have walked back 
the approach of comment k.  In section 6, the Third Restatement 
states the following: 
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due 
to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug 
or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable 
therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing 
of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not 
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.175 
Under these frameworks, prescription opioids fail to meet the 
definition of unavoidably unsafe for treating chronic, non-cancer 
pain.  Under the Toner standard, “the value” of a drug’s benefits are 
 
 167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 168. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482–83 (Cal. 1988) (holding a 
drug manufacturer “is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription drug so 
long as the drug was . . . accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities”). 
 169. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, 383 (N.J. 1984) 
(“[W]e perceive no justification for giving all prescription drug manufacturers a 
blanket immunity from strict liability and design defect claims under comment k.”). 
 170. 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1987). 
 171. Id. at 306. 
 172. 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1983). 
 173. Id. at 122. 
 174. Id. at 123. 
 175. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
706 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
weighed against “the seriousness” of its risks and “the likelihood of 
both” occurring to determine whether the drug is “unavoidably 
unsafe.”176  Prescription opioids theoretically provide the benefit of 
pain relief.177  However, whether opioids in fact provide pain relief is 
contestable.  Four-week studies concerning opioid treatment have 
shown patients to have “statistically significant but small to modest 
improvement in pain relief with no consistent improvement in 
physical functioning.”178  Longer-term pain relief is even more 
unclear,179 as are the effects of these drugs on quality of life.180  
Further, these benefits do not outweigh the serious side effects caused 
by opioids, including hyperalgesia (increased susceptibility to pain), 
respiratory depression, constipation, hormonal effects (e.g., decreased 
libido), effects on the immune system (at least in immuno-
compromised persons, such as HIV patients), and addiction.181  
Although a number of side effects caused by opioids disappear with 
continued use, constipation and hormonal effects can persist 
indefinitely.182  The risk of opioid abuse has also been measured to be 
as high as 45%, while the risk of opioid addiction183 has been assessed 
to reach as high as 50%, depending on the patient population 
studied.184  Prescription opioids have also been linked to more 
overdose deaths than illicit drugs such as cocaine185 and are the most 
common types of prescription drugs that are diverted.186  The risk of 
prescription opioid abuse has also been coupled with the use of 
heroin.  Studies have shown that, between 2008 and 2010, among 
 
 176. Toner, 732 P.2d at 306. 
 177. Jane C. Ballantyne, Opioids for Chronic Nonterminal Pain, 99 S. MED. J. 1245, 
1246 (2006) (“[C]linical observation suggests that chronic pain states are, in fact, 
relieved by opioid treatment.”). 
 178. Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223 (citing various studies). 
 179. Id.; see also Ballantyne, supra note 177, at 1246 (“The question of whether 
analgesic efficacy and other benefits of chronic opioid therapy can be maintained 
over years rather than months remains unanswered.”). 
 180. Ballantyne, supra note 177, at 1248. 
 181. Id. at 1248–49. 
 182. Id. 
 183. “Drug abuse” is the overuse of a drug without becoming physically dependent 
on it.  “Drug addiction” requires physical dependence.  See What Is the Difference 
Between Abuse and Addiction?, EVERYDAY HEALTH (Aug. 13, 2012), 
https://www.everydayhealth.com/addiction/experts-difference-between-substance-
abuse-and-drug-addiction.aspx [https://perma.cc/RQY7-B8E9]. 
 184. Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223. 
 185. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2017 NATIONAL DRUG 
THREAT ASSESSMENT 25 (2017), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/DIR-
040-17_2017-NDTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YQU-YQ57]. 
 186. Id. at 33. 
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people who used both prescription opioids and heroin, 77.4% 
reported using prescription opioids before transitioning to heroin.187 
The prevalence of negative side effects coupled with the risks of 
addiction, abuse, and transitioning to heroin outweigh the arguable 
efficacy of using opioids to treat long-term chronic pain.  This 
balancing is further supported by the FDA’s recent decision to 
remove Opana ER, an extended-release opioid,188 from the market 
because “the benefits of the drug may no longer outweigh its 
costs.”189  Based on this evidence, opioid painkillers fail to meet the 
Toner standard for being unavoidably unsafe because their side 
effects outweigh the alleged benefits. 
Under the Hansen standard, prescription opioids would also not be 
considered unavoidably unsafe.  Hansen, also weighs the costs and 
benefits of a drug, focusing on (1) whether “the product’s utility 
greatly outweigh[s]” its risks; (2) whether “the risk is a known one”; 
(3) whether the product’s benefits are “achievable in another 
manner”; (4) whether the risk is “unavoidable under the present state 
of knowledge”; and (5) whether the benefit “extend[s] to the vast 
majority of the users of the product.”190  As demonstrated supra, the 
risks associated with prescription opioids outweigh the benefits for 
the treatment of long-term chronic pain.  Bolstering this assertion, 
opioids are not a first-line treatment for chronic pain, and there are 
non-opioid treatments that can provide relief while being 
demonstrably safer.191  In other words, the benefits of opioid 
treatment are achievable in another manner without the dangerous 
 
 187. Wilson M. Compton et al., Relationship Between Nonmedical Prescription-
Opioid Use and Heroin Use, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 154, 156 (2016) (citing studies). 
 188. There are various types of opioid painkillers.  The class Ocuna ER (as well as 
OxyContin) belongs to is called “long-acting” or “extended release” opioids.  These 
opioids slowly send the drug into the body over several hours, as opposed to all at 
once. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 124.  In theory, this made extended release opioids 
less addictive.  Id. at 85.  Ironically, it has been shown that extended release opioids 
are more prone to abuse and overdose. Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs: 
Variation Among States in Prescribing Opioid Pain Relievers and Benzodiazepines – 
United States, 2012, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 563, 563 (2014). 
 189. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Requests Removal of Opana 
ER for Risks Related to Abuse (June 8, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm562401.htm 
[https://perma.cc/299B-945M]. 
 190. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 122–23 (Colo. 
1983). 
 191. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NON-OPIOID TREATMENTS FOR 
CHRONIC PAIN 1–2 (2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/pdf/nonopioid_treatments-a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/87WB-W4BK]. 
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side effects.  Furthermore, as non-cancer patients made up 86% of the 
total opioid market in 1999,192 the majority of prescription opioid 
users take a drug whose costs outweigh its benefits.  Even if the risk 
involving opioids is known and unavoidable, opioids would still fail to 
meet the Hansen standard. 
Finally, opioids fail to classify as unavoidably unsafe under the 
Third Restatement approach.  The Third Restatement asks if “the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are 
sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits” 
such that reasonable healthcare providers would not prescribe the 
drug.193 
Again, as noted above, the risks of opioids outweigh the benefits in 
terms of treating long-term, chronic pain.  Moreover, it is true that 
cancer patients and those with acute pain do benefit from opioid 
treatment, which means doctors would prescribe opioids for at least 
two classes of patients, satisfying an aspect of the Third Restatement 
approach.  However, as explained supra, this group represents a 
minority of the opioid market, and “[i]t does not serve society that an 
unavoidably unsafe product, which has occasional or factious benefit, 
should enjoy insulation from strict liability in tort when the product’s 
predominant effects are detrimental to individual and public 
safety.”194  Thus, opioids are not unavoidably unsafe under the Third 
Restatement approach. 
In treating long-term, chronic patients with opioid painkillers, the 
risks outweigh the benefits for most patients.  As a result, opioids fail 
to meet the standards of several accepted balancing tests for 
determining which drugs are unavoidably unsafe.  Accordingly, 
because opioids are not unavoidably unsafe for treating long-term, 
chronic pain, an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine 
should be created for opioids. 
III. THE EFFECTS OF CREATING THE OPIOID EXCEPTION 
TO THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE 
By exposing drug manufacturers to more liability, creating the 
opioid exception will impose a higher level of accountability on said 
manufacturers, which will, in turn, increase the cost of opioid drugs 
 
 192. See Van Zee, supra note 34, at 223. 
 193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 194. Sidney H. Willig, The Comment K Character: A Conceptual Barrier to Strict 
Liability, 29 MERCER L. REV. 545, 545 (1978). 
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and decrease their availability.195  Drug manufacturers would also be 
required to directly and adequately warn patients about the dangers 
of opioids.196  Drug manufacturers could do this by clearly stating the 
risks of addiction on drug labels and in marketing materials addressed 
to patients.197  In theory, restricting the flow of prescriptions opioids 
would help alleviate the crisis.  However, restricting the flow of 
prescription opioids might create additional problems. 
A. The Problem of Pre-Existing Chronic, Non-Cancer Pain Patients
   
First, restricting the flow of opioids will not stop patients who have 
already become dependent on opioids from being addicted; that is to 
say, a lack of opioids will not cure pre-existing addiction.  Rather, 
restricting the flow may deter future addiction, but pre-existing 
addicts, with fewer prescription opioids available and those that are 
available becoming more expensive than before198 will be pushed 
towards cheaper opiates such as heroin.199  However, many of these 
people resorted to opioids in the first place because they had no other 
way to deal with their pain.200  In the case of chronic, non-cancer pain, 
that scenario does not have to be. 
One promising approach to treating chronic pain without relying 
on opioids involves multi-disciplinary treatment.  As an illustration, 
the Center for Pain Relief at the University of Washington Medical 
 
 195. Kent Durning, No Pain No Gain?! Who Will Make the Greatest Sacrifices in 
Curbing Opioid Analgesic Diversion and Abuse?, 93 KY. L.J. 199, 234 (2004). 
 196. Jennifer A. Guidea & Shana E. Russo, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: 
A Retrospective Review to the Present, REED SMITH LIFE SCIENCES INDUSTRY 
GROUP PRESENTATION 22, 
https://www.reedsmith.com/-/media/files/events/2014/02/reed-smith-
teleseminar/files/presentation-materials/fileattachment/the-learned-intermediary-
doctrine—22714—presenta.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NPA5-Z849]. 
 197. The current OxyContin label, for instance, refers patients to a “Medication 
Guide.”  See, e.g., OxyContin, DRUGS LIBRARY, http://www.drugs-
library.com/drugs/oxycontin_bfdfe235.html [https://perma.cc/KCB4-QKZZ] 
(featuring labels).  A more effective warning would be to actually note the risk of 
addiction and other negative effects of OxyContin directly on the package in large, 
clear font, much like with cigarettes.  Compare id., with Surgeon General’s Warning 
Cigarettes, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (Jan. 28, 2017, 2:01 PM), 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Surgeon_General%27s_warning_cigarettes.j
pg [https://perma.cc/MW9X-2Z8K]. 
 198. Durning, supra note 195, at 234. 
 199. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 6. 
 200. Hughes et al., supra note 35 (stating that 62.6% of people who abused 
prescription opioids in 2015 did so to relieve pain). 
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School has adopted a “bio-psycho-social” approach to pain relief, 
using occupational therapists, physical therapists, social workers, and 
others to treat pain, and teaching patients medical and life strategies 
to control pain through exercise and maintaining a healthy diet.201  
These types of programs have been shown to improve psychological 
and physical function in patients,202 even more so than conventional 
medical treatments.203  For instance, patients who undertake multi-
disciplinary pain treatment are almost twice as likely to return to 
work as patients treated with only one medical discipline.204  The 
CDC is supportive of these treatments as well, stating that opioids are 
“not the first-line therapy for [non-cancer, palliative, or end-of-life] 
chronic pain,” and recommending a number of non-opioid treatments 
that “can provide relief to those suffering from chronic pain, and are 
safer.”205  The National Institutes of Health has also endorsed a 
multi-disciplinary approach, stating that the “best practice models for 
chronic pain management require a multidisciplinary approach 
similar to that recommended for other chronic complex illnesses such 
as depression, dementia, eating disorders, or diabetes.”206  The 
National Institutes of Health has also noted that “[r]esearch 
demonstrates that [pain] can be managed successfully using an 
interdisciplinary team-based approach to care (e.g. medicine, 
psychology, nursing, pharmacy, social work).”207  However, there are 
several reasons why this method is not used more often. 
 
 201. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 86. 
 202. Jaime Guzmán et al., Multidisciplinary Rehabilitation for Chronic Low Back 
Pain: Systematic Review, 322 BMJ 1511, 1511 (2001) (finding evidence that “intensive 
multidisciplinary biopsychosocial rehabilitation with functional restoration reduces 
pain and improves function in patients with chronic low back pain”); Mark P. Jensen 
et al., Correlates of Improvement in Multidisciplinary Treatment of Chronic Pain, 62 
J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 172, 172 (1994). 
 203. Herta Flor et al., Efficacy of Multidisciplinary Pain Treatment Centers: A 
Meta-Analytic Review, 49 PAIN 221, 225 (1992); Luca Scascighini et al., 
Multidisciplinary Treatment for Chronic Pain: A Systematic Review of Interventions 
and Outcomes, 47 RHEUMATOLOGY 670, 676 (2008) (finding multidisciplinary 
programs are more effective “than standard medical treatment”). 
 204. See Flor et al., supra note 203, at 226; see also Anders Norlund et al., 
Multidisciplinary Interventions: Review of Studies of Return to Work After 
Rehabilitation for Low Back Pain, 41 J. REHABILITATIVE MED. 115, 120 (2009) 
(finding that multidisciplinary treatment has a “significant effect” on return to work 
for “people with low back pain who are on sick leave for longer than 4 weeks”). 
 205. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 191, at 1. 
 206. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, PATHWAYS TO PREVENTION WORKSHOP: THE ROLE 
OF OPIOIDS IN THE TREATMENT OF CHRONIC PAIN 16 (2014), 
https://prevention.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/programs/p2p/ODPPainPanel
StatementFinal_10-02-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5KB-4SYX]. 
 207. Id. 
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1. Despite the Impediments to Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to 
Pain Treatment, It Still Represents an Effective Alternative to 
Opioids 
There are three main impediments to multi-disciplinary approaches 
to pain treatment.  The first is a “quick fix” mentality among patients 
that is adverse to the lengthy therapy of multi-disciplinary 
treatment.208  The second impediment is that not all areas of the 
country have access to multi-disciplinary treatment programs.209  
Finally, the third is the fact that many traditional medical insurers do 
not cover these types of programs.  As a result of the managed care 
movement, health insurers began cutting costs and reducing the types 
and amounts of reimbursable services.210  Included among the “cuts” 
were aspects of multidisciplinary treatment that were not strictly 
“medical” (components which made up a substantial portion of 
multidisciplinary treatment),211 because pills were more convenient 
and less costly.212 
Although there is no “quick fix” to the problem of a “quick fix” 
mentality among patients, the rationale of insurance companies is 
misguided.  Studies have shown multi-disciplinary treatments to result 
in a 43% savings in disability payments (estimated by some 
investigations to result in billions of dollars to third parties)213 and an 
estimated $184 million savings in medical and surgical expenses.214  A 
study done by Daisha J. Cipher, et al. demonstrated that patients who 
were treated only with pharmacological treatments imposed the 
highest costs to the healthcare system as compared to patients who 
received both pharmacological and cognitive behavioral treatment 
because their condition deteriorated after treatment.215   In response 
to this kind of data, insurance companies should be incentivized to 
subsidize multi-disciplinary treatment as a proven strategy to cut or 
contain costs associated with chronic pain. 
 
 208. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 87. 
 209. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Opioids, supra note 104 (showing 
footage of an interview with a doctor stating that many rural areas, which have been 
the hardest hit by the opioid crisis, do not have access to alternative treatments). 
 210. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 97. 
 211. See id. at 87. 
 212. See id. at 253. 
 213. See Flor et al., supra note 203, at 227. 
 214. Daisha J. Cipher et al., Cost-Effectiveness and Health Care Utilization in a 
Multidisciplinary Pain Center: Comparison of Three Treatment Groups, 8 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. MED. SETTINGS 237, 238 (2001). 
 215. Id. at 243–44. 
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Drug manufacturers could also help ameliorate the lack of multi-
disciplinary treatments in certain areas.  Currently, a multi-district 
litigation (MDL) against opioid drug manufacturers is brewing in the 
Northern District of Ohio.216  Judge Polster, who is overseeing the 
MDL, has expressed his desire to take concrete action to stop the 
opioid crisis rather than merely engage in traditional litigation.217  To 
that end, one such solution could be a cy pres remedy in which drug 
manufacturers agree, as part of a settlement, to spend money funding 
and setting up multi-disciplinary pain clinics.  Typically, cy pres 
remedies are reserved for when “a settlement cannot feasibly 
compensate class members directly,” and instead these efforts would 
provide funding to organizations or interests that share similar goals 
with the class.218  Through patient records, it is possible that the 
affected plaintiffs could be identified and compensated by a global 
settlement.219  However, if funds are left over, a cy pres settlement 
funding multi-disciplinary pain clinics would serve the same interests 
as plaintiffs (i.e., deterring future opioid abuse by transferring money 
from drug manufacturers and generating alternative treatment 
options to pain), thereby satisfying the court’s goals. In fact, Purdue 
did something similar to this by helping fund an opioid addiction and 
pain treatment center at Oklahoma State University as part of a 
settlement agreement with the state of Oklahoma.220 
If it is not feasible to provide multi-disciplinary clinics in areas that 
need them, other options exist to alleviate the opioid crisis.  If opioids 
must continue to be distributed to treat chronic pain, the CDC’s 
guidelines for opioid treatment221 should be followed.  The guidelines 
suggest, among other things: starting treatment with immediate-
 
 216. In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation, No. 17-md-02804 (N.D. Ohio 
2017), http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/mdl-2804 [https://perma.cc/EY73-4T2D]. 
 217. Transcript of Proceedings at 4–6, In re National Prescription Opiate 
Litigation, Doc. No. 58. 
 218. See Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in 
Class Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 882 (2016). 
 219. See What Information Does an Electronic Health Record (EHR) Contain?, 
supra note 158. 
 220. German Lopez, OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma Is Being Held 
Accountable for the Opioid Epidemic, VOX (Mar. 26, 2019, 11:40 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/3/26/18282262/opioid-epidemic-
purdue-pharma-oxycontin-oklahoma-lawsuit-settlement [https://perma.cc/HQ9B-
ABV5]. 
 221. DEBORAH DOWELL ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
CDC GUIDELINE FOR PRESCRIBING OPIOIDS FOR CHRONIC PAIN – UNITED STATES, 
2016 (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/rr/rr6501e1.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KJ3H-3BYH] [hereinafter CDC GUIDELINE]. 
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release opioids,222 prescribing opioids for acute pain for a short 
duration,223 continual evaluation by physicians regarding the costs 
and benefits of the treatment,224 reviewing a patient’s drug 
prescription history for concomitant medications and assessing if 
these medications, in combination with opioids, put the patient at a 
high risk for overdose,225 and using urine tests, both to ensure that the 
patient is not using any other illicit drugs226 and to test for the lack of 
drugs to verify that the patient is actually taking the medication and 
not selling it.227  The guidelines also recommend alternative 
treatments, even ones that are readily available, such as exercise.228 
B. The Problem of Cancer Patients and Other Similarly Situated 
Patients 
The second consequence of exposing drug manufacturers to 
increased liability, thereby restricting the flow of opioids, is that such 
a policy will restrict access to opioids by those most reliant on these 
agents: cancer patients and those in palliative or end-of-life care.229  
Opioids are an important component of treatment for these 
patients,230 and there is no easy solution to ensuring these patients 
 
 222. Id. at 21. 
 223. Id. at 24 (recommending prescribing no more than three to seven days-worth 
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 224. Id. at 25. 
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 226. CDC GUIDELINE, supra note 221, at 30. 
 227. Hoffman, supra note 225. 
 228. CDC GUIDELINE, supra note 221, at 17. 
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 230. QUINONES, supra note 10, at 80 (noting the importance of “pain relief and a 
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would still have the same degree of access to opioids.  Stringent 
regulations could be imposed to limit the distribution of opioids to 
only these types of patients.  Drug manufacturers and insurance 
companies could also work together to reduce the costs of these 
medications for these patients.  Or, perhaps most effectively, more 
research could be conducted to ascertain which opioids are most 
effective for cancer patients.231  Surprisingly, there are few, if any, 
nationwide studies on opioid prescriptions for cancer patients,232 and 
not all oncologists have adequate knowledge of pain management.233  
Further, not every opioid is suitable for treating cancer patients,234 
and there are conflicting results as to which opioids work for cancer 
patients.  For instance, weaker opioids are a major part of treatment 
for cancer patients in Taiwan, but the European Society of Medical 
Oncology and European Association of Palliative Care have put out 
guidelines emphasizing the use of strong opioids in treating cancer 
patients.235  Accordingly, further research should be conducted 
concerning the types of opioids that benefit cancer patients and other 
similarly situated patients.   This strategy might allow drug 
manufacturers to focus their efforts on creating drugs that benefit this 
class of patients and allowing these select opioids to pass regulatory 
hurdles, making them easier to access. 
CONCLUSION 
For decades, the learned intermediary doctrine has served as a 
formidable protection against tort liability for drug manufacturers, 
absolving them of the harms caused by their products so long as they 
adequately warned prescribing physicians.  However, drug 
manufactures have abused this exception and defeated its meaning by 
interfering with the doctor-patient relationship through excessive 
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patients with opioids); Chih-Peng Lin et al., Key Opioid Prescription Concerns in 
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 232. See Lin et al., supra note 230, at 54 (noting this study was the first to 
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 233. Id. at 52. 
 234. Id. at 51. 
 235. Id. at 55. 
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marketing and misleading statements.  In response, the principles 
underlying the learned intermediary doctrine have been questioned 
by legal scholars. The benefits of some drugs do not necessarily 
outweigh their risks, and excessive marketing campaigns affect the 
expectations of patients and encourage doctors to prescribe drugs 
against their best judgment.  The opioid crisis represents a confluence 
of these actions, and it undermines the very pillars upon which the 
learned intermediary doctrine rests. To remedy this crisis, an opioid 
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine must be crafted so 
that opioid manufacturers may be held liable in tort for the harm 
caused by their drugs. 
 
